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3 December 1965

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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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
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*Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EST)

The Military Situation in South Vietnam: On 1 December, government defenders repelled a Viet Cong attack on the district town of Binh Chanh, located ten miles southwest of Saigon. Casualty reports were not immediately available. Further south, a Communist mortar bombardment directed on a Vietnamese army training center in Ba Xuyen Province killed ten trainees.

US B-52 Stratofortress jet bombers yesterday struck a suspected location of Communist forces in southwestern Pleiku Province. Stratofortresses also bombed enemy targets in Binh Duong Province, where large allied ground forces are still searching for the Viet Cong regiment responsible for the large-scale attack in the area on 26 November.

Other Major Developments: In a recorded appearance on Moscow TV--an opportunity seldom afforded a Western statesman--British Foreign Secretary Stewart reportedly appealed for Soviet cooperation in convening a conference of "all the governments concerned" to arrange a cease-fire in Vietnam "as speedily as possible." According to the press, he stressed that in view of their role as cochairmen of the Geneva conference, the USSR and the UK have a duty to cooperate to secure an end to the war.

There has as yet been no Soviet editorial comment of Stewart's appeal, but Moscow's reaction will probably follow standard lines and avoid open divergence from Hanoi's long-standing position.

Stewart's initiative at this time reflects continued British concern over the escalation of the Vietnam war and is a repetition of efforts early this year to have

the Soviets, as cochairmen, take some joint action on negotiations. [Another consideration may have been Wilson's belief that Labor's left wing, rebuffed in their domestic programs, needed to be reassured that the Labor government was still actively pushing for a settlement in Vietnam.]

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Indonesia: Maneuvering between Sukarno and the army continues to dominate the political situation.

[Defense Minister Nasution is reported to feel that the President is becoming more active politically and is attempting to split the armed forces. Nasution believes that he is trying to circumvent the recently reorganized Supreme Operations Command as a vehicle to run the country and is making decisions without consulting the army.]

[Meanwhile,] Foreign Minister Subandrio appears to be shifting his ground in an attempt to make himself more palatable to the army. Yesterday he attacked Communist China for attempting to interfere in Indonesian internal affairs. This charge, like his recent attack on the PKI for organizing the 1 October insurrection, echoes recent statements by Nasution.

Subandrio's attempt to save his political neck may not be successful, however. He has been anathema to the army for some time, and there are some indications that Sukarno may no longer be willing to protect him.]

The army announced yesterday that it was setting up a special military tribunal to try persons who were clearly involved in the abortive coup. The military almost certainly plans to publicize widely the confessions derived from these trials.]

India-Pakistan: A meeting under Soviet auspices between Prime Minister Shastri and President Ayub appears likely in early January.

Shastri in a 1 December speech confirmed press reports that he has agreed to an early meeting at Tashkent with Ayub. In September, while Indo-Pakistani hostilities were still under way, Soviet Premier Kosygin offered his good offices and suggested that the two leaders meet on Soviet soil to restore peace between their countries. The original Soviet offer apparently was intended to achieve an immediate cease-fire.

After the cease-fire Moscow no longer seemed anxious to push its offer, apparently because it would complicate relations with India. The Pakistanis recently revived the proposal and the Soviets have publicly gone along. However, Moscow has given no indications that it wishes to play a meaningful role in arbitrating the dispute.

Karachi's growing dissatisfaction over lack of progress on the Kashmir issue at the United Nations caused the Soviet offer to become increasingly attractive to the Pakistanis. New Delhi reacted hesitantly and with misgivings but seemed anxious not to appear unreceptive to the Soviet offer.

Indian leaders have finally stated that Shastri is willing to discuss with Ayub all issues between India and Pakistan--including Kashmir--but is not willing to examine the Kashmir problem exclusively. This is a more conciliatory position than New Delhi has held in the past, but there appears to be little hope that meaningful progress toward a settlement of this highly emotional issue will be possible. Shastri would be courting political suicide if he were to make significant concessions on Kashmir at this time.

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Japan: Socialist intransigence may bring a showdown in the Japanese Diet next month.

Frustrated by the government's success in ramming the ratification of the treaty with South Korea through the Lower House, Socialist members are stalling the Sato government's legislative program by a boycott of house proceedings.

The ruling Liberal Democrats, with an eye on tradition and popular opinion, have been reluctant to use their majority to continue with important business in the face of the Socialist boycott. They have abandoned trying to pass a vital year-end budget bill in the present special session in the hope the Socialists will accept this as a face-saving victory and drop their obstructionist tactics.

The government believes the necessary budgetary action can be taken in the early days of the regular session, scheduled to begin on 20 December. Should the Socialists continue stalling after the date, however, it would pose a dilemma for the Sato government. It would then have to go against tradition and proceed with urgent budgetary business despite continued boycott by the Socialists. The alternative would be to dissolve the house and call new elections within 40 days, which at this time appears unlikely.

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France: Public support for De Gaulle's presidential candidacy has dropped but he is still expected to win a first ballot majority.

The most recent polls show that the proportion of those favoring De Gaulle has fallen from a mid-October high of 66 percent to about half of those responding. Polls taken as recently as the end of last week, however, show about a third of the electorate still in the "undecided" category. A strong majority in this category is expected to opt for De Gaulle on 5 December, choosing Gaullist stability and prosperity rather than the uncertainties which the opposition candidates represent.

De Gaulle's decision to make a television appeal to the electorate on 30 November reversed a previous announcement that he would make only one short campaign address, and indicates a genuine fear in the Gaullist camp of an electoral upset. The last-minute tightening of the race and the consequent uneasiness among Gaullists, however, probably will increase the turnout on Sunday. This is expected to work in De Gaulle's favor, since it will bring to the polls voters without distinct ties to the parties which oppose him.

Although Information Minister Peyrefitte has indicated that De Gaulle would bow out of the race if he failed to win on the first ballot, most government officials believe he would stay in for the second round. This would involve a runoff on 19 December between the two candidates receiving the largest number of votes next Sunday, assuming they chose to maintain their candidacy. De Gaulle would win such a runoff easily.

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Common Market: [The results of the EEC Council of Ministers' meeting reaffirm the Five's firm line toward France and are a strong rebuff to Paris' divisive tactics.]

[In a public communiqué, the council restated the position of the Five that a solution to the crisis caused by France's boycott of the EEC must be based on treaty rules and reached within the community framework. France was asked again to take part in a council session "in Brussels."]

[Council president Colombo has been instructed to "explain to the French the common position of the five governments." He is also to give them a memorandum stating in effect that the Five are not prepared to see any modification or even interpretations of the treaty which will affect majority voting or the powers of the EEC Commission.]

[The Five now have an "understanding" that they may proceed to pass next year's EEC and Euratom budgets by majority vote should the French fail to approve by written ballot the budget proposals adopted by the council at this session. Moreover, a Dutch Foreign Ministry official considers it "quite possible" that the Five will amend the commission's Kennedy Round negotiating mandate by majority vote if the French have not returned to Brussels by the time that issue comes up in late January.]

[Comments by Information Minister Peyrefitte after the council's meeting indicate that the French line of official optimism regarding an early solution to the EEC crisis remains unshaken. The government may consider such a position even more important now in light of the apparently increasing interest of the electorate in the "European" issue. In Brussels, however, the acting French EEC representative and French newspapermen were reportedly surprised and taken aback by the 'hardness' of the council's actions.]

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The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
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Commandant, United States Marine Corps
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Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Commander in Chief, Atlantic
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The Director, The Joint Staff
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The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
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